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Abstract
Using stock market return data from 2007 to 2019 from The Center for Research in
Security Prices, I inquire into the impact that Twitter has on the overreactions of individual stock
returns by breaking down returns into pre and post-Twitter periods. I examine negative serial
correlation, demonstrating return reversals, between a lag crossed Twitter dummy variable and
initial returns. With stock reversals serving as an indicator of initial overreaction and assuming
stationarity of overreactions over time, I find that the presence of Twitter results in significantly
more overreactions for highly followed companies when using monthly returns. However, when
assessing Twitter’s influence using weekly returns, the results suggest the possibility of return
momentum. Similarly, Twitter’s influence on overreaction is a highlighted when evaluating only
negatively or positively large returns, producing greater significance despite a decrease sample
size. While these promising results are not economically significant and thus do not reveal a
viable contrarian investment strategy, my paper lays the foundation for a predictive model based
of Twitter’s influence on company returns.
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I.

Introduction
Twitter has appeared in the forefront of how politicians communicate with their

constituents, companies communicate with their shareholders and customers, and how the people
and major media gather news. As such, Twitter is a reasonable measure of broad social media
following and retail investor interest which in turn may impact the stock market. The question is
how it will impact the stock market. While I do not doubt the ability for professionals to
correctly analyze and use Twitter breaking news, which appears in waves and consensus of
retweets, retail investors may lack this expertise, especially considering that Twitter is an
information pushing platform. Though increased information is supposed to enhance market
efficiency, the unreliable sources on Twitter and the false consensus that Twitter depicts through
the wave of information it pushes, may decrease market efficiency. Hence, I argue that
companies with large social media audiences should experience overreactions in their returns,
because of unreliable information, pseudo-consensus, and social media’s retail investor audience.
Examining the literature regarding market inefficiencies, Shleifer and Summers (1990)
discuss how “noise traders” who rely on pseudo-signals, have a herded reaction which
contributes to irrational shifts in the market that are not compensated for by arbitrageurs. Barber,
Odeon, and Zhu (2009) connect these ideas with retail investors, demonstrating their ability to
affect individual stock returns and produce subsequent rebounds. Shifting gears towards social
media, Antweiller and Frank (2007) demonstrate that internet message boards help predict
returns and volatility of the market, while Zhang, Fuehres, Gloor (2011) and Sul, Dennis, Yuan
(2014) illustrate social-media-predicted returns can originate simply from general emotional
sentiment on Twitter. Finally Tetlock(2007; 2010) proves that these broad market return shifts
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are inefficient and caused partially by investor reaction to stale information. Despite the breadth
of the current literature, it fails to address how social media impacts individual stocks.
This paper connects the literature on retail investor overreaction on particular stocks and
broad market overreaction due to social media. By examining if Twitter causes overreaction
amongst its most followed brands, I fill in the gap that represents the cross-section of these two
topics. Specifically, I test Twitter’s impact on individual stocks, attempting to demonstrate a
causal relationship that could be subject to arbitrage. Furthermore, I also examine whether this
overreaction is more prevalent in large stock shifts in particular, which other papers do not
specifically test. The next logical steps of future studies, on the condition that this study yields
significant findings, would be research that examines if trending news on social media causes
overreaction as well.
In order to fill in the gaps and expand previous literature, I examine 19 of the 50 most
followed brands on Twitter from 2007 to the end of 2019. I regress the returns of the current
period on the previous period, creating a lag variable. This study focuses on a Twitter dummy
variable(crossed with the initial lag returns) in order to demonstrate that after these companies
became popular on Twitter their returns in the next period are predictable through overreactions.
In a separate regression, I use the same methods; however with only monthly stock shifts greater
than (+/-) 0.1.
Through testing multiple dates to signify the start of the Twitter period, I find that the
monthly returns of the most followed companies, with respect to their previous returns, are
significantly negatively affected by Twitter’s rising influence in 2013, especially when large
return shifts are isolated. Therefore, after Twitter, these companies are more prone to
overreactions during an initial month period and corrections in the next month period, despite

6

return momentum when returns were analyzed weekly. My findings are consistent with the
pattern of individual stock reversals in Barber, Odeon, and Zhu (2009).
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses the development and
execution of my hypothesis. I then address the previous literature that can be connected with the
potential impact that social media may have on individual stock returns in Section III. The
literature review section is essentially split into two parts, addressing how individual stock
returns are affected by retail investor overreaction and social media’s inefficient impact on the
market in general. Section IV outlines the data: stock market returns, company sizes and retail
investor percentage data from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2019 from Wharton Research
Data Services for 19 different companies. The empirical strategy and results are presented in
Section V and VI. Section VII conveys information about unincluded tests run for robustness.
The final section concludes.
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II.

Hypothesis
In this paper my testable hypothesis remains that companies with large Twitter audiences

should experience more overreactions in their stock returns than before Twitter’s popularity. In
order to measure overreactions, I test for serial correlation. In the event that I discover
significantly negative serial correlation compared to the before Twitter period, this indicates that
Twitter stocks have become more susceptible to stock reversals. Consistent, or the significant
presence of, reversals would signal that these stocks are regularly overreacting and then
correcting in the post-Twitter period.
This testable hypothesis originates from a broader hypothesis that Twitter causes
overreactions in individual stocks. I also believe that companies with large Twitter audiences
should experience more overreactions in their returns than those that have small Twitter
audiences. Furthermore, companies that commonly trend on Twitter should also experience
overreactions. However, testing the effects of large versus small Twitter audiences and the
effects of trending on Twitter is rather difficult. These limitations for testing my broader
hypothesis are discussed more extensively in the concluding section. Therefore, in order to
examine the possible impact that Twitter could have towards individual stock overreactions, this
paper compares the degree of overreactions before and after Twitter’s rise to popularity.
I argue that Twitter’s propensity for spreading, or almost pushing information, leads
investors to rely on pseudo-signals and believe in a false consensus regarding a company’s future
stock returns. Thus, I do not believe that it is only Twitter following that causes overreaction, but
also company interests across the Twittersphere; however, I think that Twitter following acts as a
proxy for broad company interest on Twitter. It is with this belief in mind, that I also think that
companies on Twitter should experience more overreactions on average when examining large
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stock shifts only. To explain, these large shifts most likely occur with greater Twitter buzz
surrounding the highly followed company.
Nevertheless, when attempting to prove my testable hypothesis, I assume that if
popularized companies experience more overreactions after Twitter than before, this indicates
that Twitter causes these overreactions. However, this does not take into account the possibility
of time-based effects, but instead assumes stationarity in the amount of overreaction in the
market. In order to corroborate my assumption of overreaction stationarity, I turn to
Jegadeesh(1989). Jegadeesh(1989) tests for negative serial correlation in stock returns by
assembling a contrarian portfolio for the months between 1934 and 1987, finding significant
evidence of overreactions. More importantly for my corroborating my assumptions,
Jegadeesh(1989) finds a similar amount of serial correlation across subperiods of 1934 to 1987.
Consistent with other literature on monthly returns, these historic results substantiate my claim
that any major difference in serial correlation between 2007 and 2019 results from Twitter’s
impact rather than time or market-based effects.
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III.

Literature Review
In their influential paper, Shleifer and Summers (1990) revisit the efficient markets

approach and present a case for inefficient markets, citing “noise traders”. Their approach
incorporates two main assumptions. First, the authors argue that not all market demand changes
are rational. The beliefs and sentiments of these investors rest on spurious signals of future
returns, such as the advice of brokers or financial gurus. The authors continue by arguing that
experimental subjects are overconfident, chase trends, and rely too heavily on new information,
respectively. The trading spurred by pseudo-signals is correlated and aggregated to form
meaningful demand shifts; this contrasts with the null hypothesis which states that these trades
should be random and cancel each other out.
Their second assumption argues that arbitrage, which involves trading by rational
investors, does not entirely counter the inefficiencies caused by noise traders. They argue that the
riskiness of arbitrage serves to limit it and its ability to direct markets towards efficiency. Their
approach, noise traders/limited arbitrage, provides more accurate descriptions of the market and
data-consistent implications about asset prices. Thus, they surmise that investor sentiment can
shift prices away from fundamentals.
Parlaying off of Shleifer and Summers (1990) and its case for inefficient markets, Barber,
Odeon, and Zhu (2009) address the idea that incorrect investor sentiment from pseudo-signals
originates from retail trades. Thus, this begs the question if retail trades move markets,
specifically in the direction of inefficiency. In order to incorporate retail trades into their model,
the authors rationalize the use of small trade size as a proxy for individual investor trades.
However, in order to appraise the effectiveness of this proxy, the authors evaluate the correlation
between trading patterns for small signed trades in TAQ/ISSM database and trades of individual
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investors at different brokers in the 1990s. Upon finding reliable correlation, the authors look at
tick-by-tick transaction data from 1983 to 2001 from the ISSM and TAQ.
The authors observe that, in addition to the correlation between small trades and
individual investor trades, individual investing exhibits dependable evidence of herding. Though
herding constitutes an indication of inefficiency alone, the researchers uncover that stocks
heavily bought by individual investors earn strong returns the following week (or vice versa);
this pattern persists for a few weeks and then reverses. Finally, stocks heavily bought by
individual investors underperform heavily sold stocks by 4.4 percentage points the following
year. The subsequent return reversals that accompany these individual investor favorites,
establish the possibility for retail investor-oriented platforms to cause temporary market
inefficiencies.
Shifting gears, the following few sources serve to illustrate the effect that social media
has on returns and the market in general, in order to lead the way for discussion and research on
social media and its relationship to noise traders and inefficiency. As one of the foundations for
research on social media’s impact on returns, Antweiller and Frank (2004) analyze internet stock
messages across Yahoo Finance and Raging Bull in 2000. They compare these messages to
financial data from the TAQ database of the 45 stocks that make up the DIA and XLK and an
exchange-traded fund that served as a proxy for the market. Their hypothesis involves the ideas
that the message volume and their bullishness predict returns or volatility and that disagreements
between posts results in higher trading volume. Through contemporaneous regressions, the
study affirms that greater bullishness is significantly positively related to returns and message
volume serves as an indicator of volatility for both the DIA and XLK, even when accounting for
the volatility caused by increased trading volume. While Antweiller and Frank (2004) support
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the argument that retail investors and social media (message posts) have significant impacts on
the market, they do not indicate if this impact originates from efficient rational investing, such as
decreased information asymmetry, and inefficient investing, such as that of noise investors.
Antweiller and Frank’s work led to further research regarding social media’s impact on
markets, examining if they detract or contribute to efficiency. Zhang, Fuehres, Gloor (2011)
assess if non-fundamental social media information affects returns. Through March 2009 and
September 2009, the authors collect between 8100 and 43040 tweets per day. By measuring the
emotional composition of these tweets, hope or fear, and comparing those sentiments to various
indices, the researchers demonstrate significant correlations between the emotions of tweets and
the DIA, S&P500, NASDAQ, and VIX. Thus, simply analyzing emotional developments on
Twitter can be used as a predictor of future stock movement. While these results could indicate
that non-fundamental information causes inefficient returns for the companies within these
indices, the indices are also highly correlated with the overall movement of the market. Thus,
public sentiment could be correlated with greater macroeconomic factors, meaning there could
be no direct causation between tweet emotions and returns.
Building upon Zhang, Fuehres, Gloor (2011), alternative research corroborates the idea
that emotional sentiment on Twitter has a legitimate causal relationship with market returns. Sul,
Dennis, Yuan (2014) match emotional tweets about a firm specifically to the returns of that
firm’s stock. Through analyzing tweets and stocks in the S&P 500 between March 2011 and
February 2012, the researchers find significant evidence that overall emotional valence is related
to a firm’s stock returns. Therefore Sul, Dennis, Yuan (2014) demonstrate that the correlation
between public sentiment and macroeconomic factors does not account for the impact that
emotional tweets have on the market. By narrowing down previous studies, focusing on
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comparisons for individual firms, the authors present a strong argument that irrational
information could predict next day stock returns. However, to illustrate that the irrational impact
that social media has on the markets is indeed inefficient, overreactions should be observable
through return reversals.
Hence, related research also looks at the possibly inefficient relationship between the
media and the stock market. Using General Inquirer to analyze the pessimism in the WSJ
“Abreast of the Market” column from 1984 to 1999, Tetlock (2007) finds that pessimism not
only precedes downward prices but also a subsequent reversal to the original “fundamentals”. In
accordance with the assumption that reversals indicate initial inefficient movements, Tetlock’s
tests confirm that the analyzed media information does not provide anything new regarding asset
prices. However, Tetlock (2007) fails to describe why media sentiment predicts reversals,
whether that be from unjustified indications of consensus, or saturation of topic news that would
make pinpointing reliable or meaningful sources difficult.
Accordingly, Tetlock (2010) later performs research that more closely lines up with the
hypothesis of this paper. To clarify, he tries to pinpoint what mechanisms cause the inefficiency
and reversals. Tetlock (2010) investigates if stock market investors are able to differentiate
between new and old information. His study’s results provide significant evidence that while
stocks react less to stale news (news that has cycled ten times), the reaction and reversal are
statistically substantial. Therefore, Tetlock (2007; 2010) provides grounds and reasoning behind
an inefficient market hypothesis due to the media.
By connecting Barber, Odeon, and Zhu’s (2009) results regarding pseudo-signals and
retail investor overreactions towards individual stocks, with Tetlock’s (2007; 2010) results
regarding social media’s tendency to cause overreactions in the market in general, this paper
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explores a cross section, or gap, between these two branches of literature. Unlike Barber, Odeon,
and Zhu (2009), this paper focuses on social media popularity as a particular cause of
overreactions, and unlike Tetlock(2007; 2010), this paper tests if social media causes
overreaction in individual stocks. As a general summary, by examining next period returns in
comparison to previous period returns, before and after Twitter and for specific companies, this
paper tests if Twitter popularity causes overreaction in its most popular stocks. Lastly, this paper
also tests whether overreactions associated with Twitter are more prevalent within large return
shifts. To the best of my knowledge, no literature has explicitly addressed this intersection, social
media and individual stock overreaction, or if the individual stock overreaction from social
media is more prevalent in large return shifts.
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IV.

Data
The data I use for my analysis of overreactions in the stock market due to Twitter

originates from CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices), provided by WRDS, from
January 2007 to December 2019. This data period is optimal because it stretches early enough to
account for a period before Twitter became popular/influential, allowing period comparisons.
This forces me to include the volatility that originated from the 2008 Great Recession. However,
based on the previously mentioned study, Jegadeesh(1989), looking at monthly data, there was a
similar pattern of serial correlation from 1934 to 1987. Therefore, serial correlation or
overreaction in the stock market seems to be fairly chronologically stationary. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that the increased volatility during 2008/2009 should not bias my
regression results, but simply add to my sample size. Furthermore, CRSP’s available data
restricts my analysis to the end of 2019.
The initial scope of my data examines the 50 most followed brands, using live Twitter
statistics from a social media tracker, SocialBakers. However, despite the original 50 companies
considered, there are a number of restrictions for the companies that I could use to test my
hypothesis, leaving my data to consist of the returns of 19 different companies rather than 50 for
a regression. While I believe 19 companies is a small sample size, expanding the scope of my
data to the top 100 or even 200 most followed brands could dilute the significance of my
regressions. To explain, the number of followers of the 50th to the 100th most followed
companies drops dramatically, and I would expect that Twitter’s impact on the stock of the 100th
most followed company drops accordingly.
Next, I will discuss the restrictions placed the companies included in my dataset.
Amongst these 50 companies, there are multiple subsidiaries of the same firm and also private
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companies. Also, the remaining companies need to be widely traded and need enough historical
data. I find it pertinent to only include stocks that are majorly traded on the NYSE to ensure
adequate trade volume, maintain consistency in the data, guarantee retail activity (as opposed to
OTC trades), and finally to keep the data within my US-centric analysis.
Lastly, an important criterion for this study is that the stock has enough relevant data
before Twitter’s influence appeared to produce an efficient sample size. Not only could newly
created/IPO’d companies exhibit more overreaction and skew results, they also do not allow for
this study’s period comparison. On that note, two of the 19 companies, Tesla and Michael Kors,
do not have public data going back to 2007; however, they have enough data to be usable. In the
end, the data consists of 19 different companies. Following these restrictions and analyzing stock
returns by weekly and monthly periods, the sample sizes are 12,406 and 2,864, respectively.
To explore Twitter as a potential cause of overreaction in the company stocks, I create a
continuous variable that captures the stock returns of these companies measured either weekly or
monthly. Previous literature has demonstrated that before stock reversals, there is often a period
of continued momentum in which irrational stock returns persists. Thus in order to successfully
detect investor overreactions, it is important to observe stock returns monthly and weekly.
Returns are calculated as the change in the company’s stock over the week or month long period
divided by the average stock price during that same period of time. Whereas the average stock
price is the mean of the average between the bid and ask price of the stock. One of the primary
independent variables in my dataset is lag returns, which is the returns of the previous week or
month relative to current returns.
Moving forward, in order to directly compare overreactions in these stocks before and
after Twitter, I create a set of indicator variables for Twitter. First, I create a Twitter indicator
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variable equal to 1 if it is after 2010 and 0 if it is before 2010. 2010 represents a year of massive
Twitter growth and usage milestones such as signing a 100 million new users in a given year.
Because there is some debate over what the correct timing for the indicator variable should be, I
create two analogous indicator variables for 2013 and 2016. 2013 marks a significant turning
point for Twitter because Twitter performed its initial public offering in November 2013, gaining
much wider public and media attention. 2016 signifies the year that Twitter gained extensive
financial, economic, and most prominently political impact.
My data includes the market cap in billions as of December 31, 2019, of each of the
companies in the regression, which I take the natural log of, to represent the natural log of firm
size. Using market cap and the natural log in my regression is consistent with other literature.
The percentage of each company owned by retail investors, as stated on CNN Business as of
October 2020, represents another important control variable. Each of these two variables, size
and retail percentage, are continuous across the companies included in my data; however, these
variables are constant over time within each company within my dataset.
I present summary statistics by month and week in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. There
are several noteworthy results. Looking at monthly returns first, the returns of the before Twitter
period are consistently lower than the returns of the after Twitter period, and they also have a
larger standard deviation. The lower returns in the first major period are explained by the Great
Recession and the slow recovery period, which also explains the volatility. The lower average
returns is especially noticeable when compared to the positive returns experienced during the last
10 years of bull market.
Looking at weekly returns, the standard deviation of weekly returns in Table 2 are just as
large, if not larger than those found in Table 1’s monthly returns. Finally turning focus towards
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the other variables of Table 1 and 2, the mean size differs between the before and after Twitter
period, even though size is kept constant over time for each company because of the few
companies in the data that became public later than 2007.
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V.

Empirical Strategy
To examine the possibility of overreactions in the stock market due to Twitter and retail

investor activity, this study utilizes the following regression model:
𝑌!"#,% = 𝛼 + 𝛽# 𝑌!,% + 𝛽& 𝑇𝑤% + 𝛽' )𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑇𝑤% + + 𝛿# 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒% + 𝛿& )𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒% + + 𝛿' 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐%
+ 𝛿( (𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐% ) + 𝜀%,!
where 𝑌!"#,% measures the returns in the period immediately after the initial period(t). 𝑌!,%
represents the lag returns, that is, the returns in the period prior to 𝑌!"#,% . As stated, the returns
of 𝑌!"#,% and 𝑌!,% are grouped weekly or monthly depending on the regression specification. 𝑇𝑤%
is the post-Twitter indicator variable, which categorizes the dataset into two main time periods,
before and after Twitter. In separate regression specifications, 𝑇𝑤% indicates shifts after 2010,
2013, and 2016, and the Twitter indicator variable is crossed with the lag returns, )𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑇𝑤% +.
The beta associated with the interaction variable is the main parameter of interest. Significant
results would indicate that lag returns influence returns in the post-twitter period relative to the
pre-twitter period. A positive coefficient demonstrates that heavily followed companies on
Twitter exhibit momentum within their returns, while a negative coefficient exhibiting reversals,
or overreactions. Though I suspect in population that a negative coefficient exists, detecting it
may be difficult because I am unsure how long reversals normally occur after an initial
overreaction. Thus, I have no priors on whether the coefficients will be positive or negative
based on monthly and weekly returns.
Furthermore, for a separate regression, I only include previous period returns, 𝑌!,% ,
that are larger in absolute value than 0.1 for monthly returns. This threshold represents roughly
the 10th and 90th percentiles of monthly stock returns. By specifically examining the relationship
between Twitter crossed lag returns and initial period returns after a large stock shift, I test if
19

Twitter’s impact on stock returns is more or less noticeable in large movements. In other words,
are large stock return shifts more likely to be the result of an overreaction from Twitter?
Next, I explain the rationale and reasoning for the inclusion of the (S) size and retail
percentage (RP) variables (in addition to crossing them with lag returns) in my regression
framework. For some background information, a potentially prominent source of error that this
study faces is how to account for subsidiaries in my regression. Because this paper focuses on
how Twitter helps predict returns of the stock market in a future period, it is reasonable to
assume that when a popular Twitter brand is only a subsidiary of a larger company, Twitter
should not have as large of a relationship with the stock market movement. While data regarding
each of these company’s subsidiaries is publicly available, the subsidiaries would need to be
deeply analyzed in order to understand how to record the sensitivity of a parent organization’s
stock to news on its subsidiary. This, however, is beyond the scope of this study. With this
potentially unaccounted error in mind, my regression framework includes a firm size variable,
𝑆% , and its cross with lag returns, )𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑆% +. To explain, by identifying a company as extremely
large, this could communicate that the popular brand on Twitter is part of a larger organization.
The other variable with the potential to impact returns when crossed with lag returns is
the percent of retail ownership for each of these companies, 𝑅𝑃% and )𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑅𝑃% +. I argue that
Twitter, and even social media as a whole, causes overreactions in the stocks of its highly
followed companies because it pushes information on retail investors. It is their lack of
experience that could potentially cause retail investors to believe unreliable information, detect
nonexistent stock trends, and overlook the relatively small hints of useful information. Therefore,
companies that have high retail ownership should be more susceptible to overreaction. Because
social media presence and high retail investor interest are most likely highly correlated, the
20

inclusion of this variable isolates the impact that social media has on the market from retail
investor effects.
Though I have not included variables in my regression framework that account for timebased differences in the overreactions of these stocks, I rely on the Jegadeesh(1989) to indicate
that time-based variables are unnecessary. Finally I have not included other variables that are,
unrelated to my hypothesis, but may help build a predictive model based on inefficient stock
market movement. Isolating for all possible causes of inefficiency in the market is beyond the
scope of this paper. This study aspires to narrow down on an inefficient model rather than
complete it. With that said, the robust regression yielded the following.
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VI.

Results
The results for monthly returns when Twitter is measured as post-2010, 2013, and 2016

are presented in columns 1,2, and 3 of Table 3, respectively. There are several noteworthy
results. The cross-term between Twitter and lag returns is negative for all Twitter measurements;
however it has the largest magnitude for 2013. As expected, late 2013 represents the most
significant shift between a before Twitter time and an after period time. In other words, a time
when Twitter had no financial market impact to a time when Twitter could stir up overreaction in
the stock market. Twitter’s 2013 is marked by further user growth (200 million monthly users),
maturation of Twitter’s influence in media and across other forms of social media, and finally its
IPO. LagXTwitter for 2013 has a beta that is slightly over 3 robust standard errors away from the
null, indicating that with over 99% confidence LagXTwitter can predict future returns.
This signifies that when associated with the returns of the previous month, the presence
of Twitter causes stock reversals in the next period. Highly followed companies experience these
reversals with greater frequency after Twitter than before. Because I find significant results
through the regression of monthly reversals, this presents the argument that stock reversals occur
a month after overreaction from Twitter.
Second, the regression of monthly returns using a 2016 Twitter dummy variable conveys
similar, yet slightly less significant results. Casual empiricism dictates that LagXTwitter, using
2016, is not significant at conventional levels because Twitter had already gained notable
influence by late 2013. However, considering 2016’s dummy variable is still considerable, this
suggests that the tendency for Twitter to generate overreactions amongst its most followed
brands is growing. It seems like Twitter’s economic, financial, and political reach is expanding
since 2013 especially after the 2016 election.
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Furthermore, Table 4 displays a positive serial correlation between LagXTwitter and
initial period returns when using weekly returns. Though these coefficients are insignificant by
conventional standards, their signum suggests that Twitter causes stock return momentum before
monthly reversals occur. This is consistent with the pattern of individual stock reversals in
Barber, Odeon, and Zhu (2009).
Discussing the other variables of Table 3 and 4, the only other significant variable is Size.
The positively significant Size variable indicates that when lag equals 0, large companies on
Twitter have experienced positive returns on average. This result is logically reasonable when I
consider that companies that have become popular on Twitter and have large market caps have
probably grown significantly during the recent bull market period. All other variables are
insignificant; however the signum of variables such as LagXSize and LagXRetail are consistent
with my rationale for including these variables in my regression, as described above in the
empirical strategy section.
Table 5 displays the results of a similar regression of monthly returns however this time
only using large lag return datapoints(+/- 0.1). The cross-term between Twitter (2013) and lag
returns is very statistically significant. It has a t-statistic of approximately -3.4 with a coefficient
of -0.17. Furthermore, unlike the previous regressions which use all return data, this regression
yields a statistically significant beta for the cross between Twitter (2016) and lag returns. This
indicates that Twitter’s tendency to cause overreactions in the returns of the most followed
companies is more pronounced with large return shifts. My interpretation for these more
significant results is as follows. As companies draw attention on Twitter, the event that the
attention is focused around becomes more widely known and frequently retweeted. Therefore,
Twitter causes this buzz to exponentially expand, overemphasizing the event importance on the
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overall value of a company. Logically, this exponential effect occurs more with larger events,
which cause larger initial market reactions.
As a final concluding, compared to all other factors that contribute to the direction of a
stock’s price, the relationship that I have found is still economically insignificant. This intuition
is corroborated by my regression’s very small R-squared, meaning that the majority of next day
returns are explained by other unknown variables or are even unexplainable. Thus researching
other outside information about a company, such as its financial or strategy, is needed to make
LagXTwitter’s beta useful for investment strategy.
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VII.

Robustness Tests

I also perform a number of robustness tests. First, as seen in Table 5, in order to measure
the effect that large market shifts have on next period returns after Twitter, I only include lag
returns that are below the 10th and above the 90th percentiles of returns in the period between
2007 and 2019. Table 5 depicts a regression that includes monthly returns and 2013 & 2016
Twitter dummy variables. However, I actually test the effect of large market shifts in 4 other
regressions. In addition to using monthly returns and a 2010 Twitter dummy variable, I also use
large weekly returns and 2010, 2013, and 2016 dummy variables. However, because only the
regression with monthly returns and 2013 and 2016 Twitter dummy variables yield significant
results, I elect to only include these two regressions. In my view, this allows for clear
comparison between the regressions that use all return data and the regression that only used data
on large return shifts. However, these additional results are available upon request.
Second, I re-estimate equation 1 adding two additional control variables: a cross-term
between size, lag returns, and Twitter, and a cross-term between retail, lag returns, and Twitter. I
hypothesize that these triple cross-term variables may demonstrate how much Twitter’s tendency
to cause overreaction is because of a company’s size or retail ownership. However, the
coefficients on these additional cross-terms are statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
This suggests that a company’s size or retail ownership do not noticeably affect Twitter’s
tendency to cause overreactions amongst its most followed companies. Thus, just as the stock
reactions that Twitter causes are inefficient, the reasons behind these inefficient reactions are
unexplainable as well. Results are available upon request
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VIII.

Conclusion

In the current political and financial age, Twitter has arisen as an important tool for
politicians and companies to speak with their constituents and customers/investors. Twitter has
thus become viable information hub because of the previously mentioned direct connection that
it allows. However, within this hub, third parties constantly exchange ideas, facts, rumors, and
falsehoods. Oftentimes, rumors appear first on Twitter because of Twitter’s easy and immediate
disbursement of information, leaving it up to investors to decide if the information that they are
receiving is true, false, or overexaggerated. Because retail investors most likely are highly
impressionable, rely on Twitter for information, and are probably unable to differential between
meaningful trustworthy news and irrelevant unreliable news, Twitter and social media in general
may instigate inefficient markets. Following this logic, companies with large social media
audiences experience overreactions in their stock returns.
Regarding current knowledge on this topic, the literature can be split into two main
branches: how retail investor’s contribute to overreactions in the returns of individual stock
returns and how social media sentiment produces overreactions in the market in general. First,
Shleifer and Summers (1990) represents the foundation of this first branch of literature; in their
research, they discuss how “noise traders” react based on pseudo-signals as a herd, and that
arbitrageurs do not leverage this irrational shift because of the risk involved. Barber, Odeon, and
Zhu (2009) build off of the hypothesis of inefficient markets by relating retail investor activity
with subsequent rebounds. Thus, the authors support the argument that stocks targeted by retail
investor activity experience overreactions. Following the branch of literature focused specifically
on social media’s impact on the market, current knowledge ends with Sul, Dennis, Yuan (2014)
and Tetlock(2007; 2010). Sul, Dennis, Yuan (2014) demonstrates that current emotional
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sentiment on Twitter predicts future returns. Tetlock(2007; 2010) proves that market shifts
resulting from social media are inefficient by recording rebounds.
This paper attempts to connect the first branch of literature which states that stocks with
large retail investor interest experience overreactions and the second branch of knowledge that
points out that social media causes inefficient shifts of the market. Thus, there is a gap in existing
knowledge regarding if overreaction due to social media can be predicted in the returns of
individual stocks. In order to fill this gap, this study focuses on the returns of 19 of the 50 most
followed brands on Twitter from 2007 to the end of 2019. With the objective to test if Twitter
can be predictor of future returns, I set up a lag regression, consisting of a Twitter dummy
variable interacted with previous period returns. The Twitter dummy variable serves to indicate a
shift from before Twitter’s influence in the stock market to after.
When the Twitter dummy variable marks 2013 as this shift, my regression results indicate
that the monthly returns of the most followed companies are negatively predicted by the presence
of Twitter, when the returns of the previous month are taken into account. I detect a negative
relationship with 99% certainty. The negative coefficient of this relationship reveals that Twitter,
and by assumption social media in general, initiates overreactions in the monthly returns of its
most followed companies. Interestingly, though the relationship between the Twitter dummy and
future returns in the weekly regression is insignificant, it is positive. This corroborates the
findings of Barber, Odeon, and Zhu (2009) by indicating that before returns reverse to
demonstrate overreaction, there could be a period of return momentum. Finally, when only large
return shifts are used for regression analysis, Twitter’s impact on the overreactions of individual
stocks is even more pronounced.
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As discussed at the end of my results section, due to the economically insignificance of
the serial correlation between present day returns and the Twitter dummy interacted with lag
returns, the results of this regression do not substantiate invest strategy changes. This is one of
the main shortcomings of this paper. In other words, forming an investment strategy to take
advantage of the discovered overreactions would not result in a positive alpha, especially if this
strategy were to replace investments based on more comprehensive background research on a
stock. Another shortcoming to be aware of is the limited amount of companies that could be
analyzed, because as explained in my data section, few of the top followed companies qualified
for my regression and the lesser followed companies may not have significant overreactions in
the market.
A logical next step after this paper would be a regression that compares companies with
little or no Twitter following to those that have large Twitter following. Though I initially
perceived this regression as a more valuable indicator of the effect that Twitter has on individual
stock returns, I immediately approached roadblocks during my research. It is very difficult to
find non-Twitter companies that are even slightly comparable to the top followed Twitter
companies, especially in the US. I discovered a pattern of differences in size, popularity in
normal media, retail investor following, and financial ratios and reasonably assumed there are
many more differences between Twitter and non-Twitter companies that would need to be
controlled for. However, given amble time and resources, this seems like a reasonable step.
Another path for further research would be to analyze if the degree that stocks trend on
Twitter after a certain event or incident could dictate how much an individual security’s returns
overreacted to said event. This could uncover actionable investment strategies for positive alpha,
given that statistically significant results were found. I believe that a hypothesis surrounding this
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idea would be extremely interesting but difficult to explore. Researchers would need to have data
on when a company trended on Twitter because of a specific event and the company’s stock
returns that followed. For a reasonable sample size, this would involve the events of numerous
different companies. To my knowledge, this data does not currently exist, at least publicly.
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties that I suspect for further research, I believe that
examining the relationship between social media and stock returns to identify investment
strategies should be a continued area of focus.
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